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RONALD DWORKIN’S JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS
AND PARTNERSHIP CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY
(WITH A COMMENT TO JEREMY WALDRON’S
“A MAJORITY IN THE LIFEBOAT”)
Imer B. FLORES
Resumen:
En este artículo el autor se enfoca principalmente en la última parte de
Justice for Hedgehogs (Justicia para erizos), de Ronald Dworkin y en su
argumento a favor de la concepción asociativa o societaria de democra-
cia. Para tal propósito, primero, recuerda algunas de las características
centrales que Dworkin ha adelantado en obras anteriores, pero intrínse-
camente relacionadas, acerca de moralidad política, la igualdad y la de-
mocracia; segundo, reevalúa los argumentos a favor de la concepción
asociativa o societaria de democracia; tercero, reconsidera la resistencia
producida por Jeremy Waldron en su “A Majority in the Lifeboat” (“Una
mayoría en el bote salvavidas”), y la respuesta ofrecida por Dworkin, pero
toda vez que puede parecer insuficiente, trata de presentar una respues-
ta alternativa —o complementaria— para responder al reto de Waldron.
Finalmente insiste en la importancia de tomar a Ronald Dworkin seria-
mente.
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Abstract:
In this article the author focuses mainly in the last part of Ronald
Dworkin´s Justice for Hedgehogs and in his argument for a partnership
conception of democracy. For that purpose, first, he recalls some of the
main features that Dworkin had advanced in previous but intrinsically re-
lated works, about political morality, equality and democracy; second, he
reassess the arguments for a partnership conception of democracy; third,
he reconsiders the resistance produced by Jeremy Waldron in his “A Major-
ity in the Lifeboat” and the response provided by Dworkin, but since it may
appear insufficient, he intends to present an alternative —or complemen-
tary— riposte in order to meet Waldron’s challenge; and, finally, he insists
in the importance of taking Ronald Dworkin seriously.
Keywords:




The fox knows many things, but the
hedgehog knows one big thing.
ARCHILOCHUS
Value is one big thing. The truth
about living well and being good and
what is wonderful is not only coher-
ent but mutually supporting: what we
think about any one of these must
stand up, eventually, to any argu-
ment we find compelling about the
rest.
Ronald DWORKIN
SUMMARY: I. Introduction: Dworkin’s Justice for Hedge-
hogs. II. Political Morality, Equality and Democ-
racy. III. Dworkin’s Partnership Conception of
Democracy. IV. Comment to Jeremy Waldron’s “A
Majority in the Lifeboat”. V. Conclusion: Taking
Ronald Dworkin Seriously.
I. INTRODUCTION: DWORKIN’S JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS
Taking Ronald Dworkin and his Justice for Hedgehogs1 seri-
ously implies taking “value seriously”.2 This is the one big
thing that Dworkin, i.e. the self-proclaimed hedgehog of our
time, knows and is willing to defend from “several foxy
causes”, such as “value skepticism”, “value pluralism” and
“value conflict”.3 On the contrary, by defending the large
and old philosophical thesis of “the unity of value”,4 he ar-
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1 Vid. Dworkin, Ronald, Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Harvard University Press, 2011. Vid. also “Symposium Justice for Hedgehogs: A
Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s Forthcoming Book”, Boston University Law Re-
view, Vol. 90, No. 2, April, 2010, pp. 465-1086.
2 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, p. 17.
3 Ibidem, pp. 7-11.
4 Ibidem, p. 1. I will like to suggest that the “unity of value” thesis in Dworkin’s
thought can be traced all the way back to the early publication of “The Model of
gues —as he has been arguing for more than forty years
and to different extents— for the integration of “ethical and
moral values”, “personal and political morality”, and “law
and morality”.5
In the different parts of the book, Dworkin presents argu-
ments: for truth about value and against various forms of
skepticism (“Part I: Independence”);6 for conceptual inter-
pretation and against collaborative or explanatory interpre-
tation (“Part II: Interpretation”);7 for a morality of self-affir-
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Rules I” in 1967 and has remained ever since throughout his works. There are at
least two grounds for such claim: 1) the weight dimension of principles; and 2) the
interconnection of principles. Vid. Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, Tak-
ing Rights Seriously, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University
Press, 1978. (Originally published: 1977.) (There is Spanish version: Los derechos
en serio, trans. Marta Guastavino, Barcelona, Ariel, 1984.) Ibidem, pp. 26 and 41:
“[principles] have a dimension that rules do not — the dimension of weight or im-
portance” and “principles rather hang together than link together [as rules do]”.
5 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, pp. 1-19. On the integration of
law and morality: Vid. Dworkin, Ronald, “Introduction: Law and Morals”, in Justice
in Robes, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 1-35.
(There is Spanish version: La justicia con toga, trans. Marisa Iglesias Vila e Íñigo
Ortiz de Urbina Gimeno, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2007.) Ibidem, pp. 34-35: “we might
treat law not as separate from but as a department of morality. We understand po-
litical theory that way: as part of morality more generally understood but distin-
guished, with its own substance, because applicable to do distinct institutional
structures. We might treat legal theory as a special part of political morality distin-
guished by a further refinement of institutional structures.”
6 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, pp. 21-96. It is worth to men-
tion that “Part I: Independence” was labeled in the previous versions of the manu-
script as “Part I: Objectivity” and as “Part I: Truth”. Both concepts are closely re-
lated to his previous work, vid. Dworkin, Ronald, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d
Better Believe It”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, No. 25, 1996, pp. 87-139.” On objec-
tivity and skepticism: Vid. also Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 171-174 and 175-177.
7 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, pp. 97-188. Dworkin’s “con-
ceptual interpretation” can be traced all the way back to his “interpretive attitude”
and “interpretive concepts”, which appear for first time in Law’s Empire: Vid.
Dworkin, Ronald, Law’s Empire, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University
Press, 1986, pp. 47 and 49. (There is Spanish version: El imperio de la justicia: de
la teoría general del derecho, de las decisiones e interpretaciones de los jueces y
de la integridad política y legal como clave de la teoría y práctica, trans. Claudia
Ferrari, Barcelona, Gedisa, 1992.) But which have their roots in A Matter of Princi-
ple, where he not only recharacterized “legal argument and analysis as interpretive
in character” and “law as interpretation” but also referred to “interpretive argu-
ments” and “interpretive judgments”: Vid. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, supra
note 6, pp. 3-4, 117-177, and 171.
mation and against a morality of self-abnegation, by
developing accounts of the indispensable conditions of liv-
ing well, such as (human) dignity that includes two princi-
ples: self-respect and authenticity,8 along as a defense of
free will and responsibility,9 as well as for a substantive
morality concerning duty, harm and obligation, including
associative and political obligations (“Part III: Ethics” &
“Part IV: Morality”);10 finally, for a partnership conception of
democracy and against a majoritarian conception of democ-
racy, by reviewing his arguments about political morality,
including political, legal and human rights, and revising his
interpretive conceptions of liberty, equality and democracy;
and, last but certainly not least, by revisiting the relation-
ship between law and morals (“Part V: Politics”).11
In my commentary, I intend to focus mainly in the last
part of Justice for Hedgehogs and in the core argument for a
partnership conception of democracy. For that purpose, fol-
lowing this opening Section I, we will: recall, in Section II,
some of the main features that Dworkin had advanced in
previous but intrinsically related works, about political mo-
rality, equality and democracy; reassess, in Section III, his
arguments for a partnership conception of democracy; re-
consider, in Section IV, the resistance produced by Jeremy
Waldron in his “A Majority in the Lifeboat” and the re-
sponse provided by Dworkin, but since it may appear insuf-
69
RONALD DWORKIN´S JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS
8 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, pp. 189-218. The two princi-
ples were introduced early on: vid. ibidem, p. 2: “No government is legitimate un-
less it subscribes to two reigning principles. First, it must show equal concern for
the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion. Second, it must respect
fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide for himself how to make
something valuable of his life.” And, defined later on: vid. ibid., pp. 203-204: “The
first is a principle of self-respect. Each person must take his own life seriously: he
must accept that it is a matter of importance that his life be a successful perfor-
mance rather than a wasted opportunity. The second is a principle of authenticity.
Each person has a special, personal responsibility for identifying what counts as
success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility to create that life through a
coherent narrative or style that he himself endorses.”
9 Ibidem, pp. 219-252.
10 Ibidem, pp. 189-252 & 253-324.
11 Ibidem, pp. 325-423.
ficient we will try to present an alternative —or complemen-
tary— riposte in order to meet Waldron’s challenge; and,
finally, in the closing Section V, we will insist in the
importance of taking Ronald Dworkin seriously.
II. POLITICAL MORALITY, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY
Let me start this part by bringing to mind that more than
three lustrums ago the book Life’s Dominion. An Argument
about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom12 was
available; two lustrums ago, the book Sovereign Virtue. The-
ory and Practice of Equality was in print;13 and one lustrum
ago, the Scribner Lectures at Princeton University were de-
livered and, one year later, published in a book titled Is
Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political De-
bate;14 and, finally, his long awaited and already world fa-
mous Justice for Hedgehogs is due to appear early in 2011.
This information is relevant, since Dworkin at the begin-
ning of “Part V: Politics”, the last but certainly not the least
of equally important parts of his forthcoming book, ad-
vances that since “I have written a good deal about political
morality, particularly in my books Life’s Dominion, Sover-
eign Virtue, and Is Democracy Possible Here?... I ask readers
70
IMER B. FLORES
12 Vid. Dworkin, Ronald, Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthana-
sia, and Individual Freedom, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. (There is another edi-
tion: New York, Vintage Books, 1994.) (There is Spanish version: El dominio de la
vida. Una discusión acerca del aborto, la eutanasia y la libertad individual, trans.
Ricardo Caracciolo & Victor Ferreres, Barcelona, Ariel, 1998.)
13 Vid. Dworkin, Ronald, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2010. (There is Spanish
version: Virtud soberana. La teoría y la práctica de la igualdad, trans. Fernando
Aguiar González & María Julia Bertomeu, Madrid, Paidós, 2003; and a book review
of mine: Flores, Imer B., “Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Prac-
tice of Equality”, in Cuestiones Constitucionales. Revista Mexicana de Derecho
Constitucional, No. 3, julio-diciembre 2000, pp. 283-291.)
14 Dworkin, Ronald, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political
Debate, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006. (There is Spanish version: La
democracia posible. Principios para un nuevo debate político, trans. Ernest Weikert
García, Barcelona, Paidós, 2008.)
to treat those books as incorporated into this one by refer-
ence”.15
On the one hand, Dworkin advances in the first three
chapters of Sovereign Virtue the “idea of equality” beginning
in a principle, i.e. “the abstract egalitarian principle”, which
“stipulates that government must act to make the lives of
citizens better, and must act with equal concern for the life
of each member.”16 In Chapter 4 “Political Equality” he ex-
plores the relationship between democracy and equality, by
addressing the question: “What form of democracy is most
appropriate to an egalitarian society?”17 For that purpose,
he introduces a crucial distinction between two different
approaches:18
The first approach offers… a dependent interpretation or
conception of democracy, because it supposes that the best
form of democracy is whatever form is most likely to produce
the substantive decisions and results that treat all members
of the community with equal concern. On that view, the
main features of a democracy —near-universal suffrage, free
speech, and the rest— are justified because a community in
which the vote is widely held and speech is free is more
likely to distribute material resources and other opportuni-
ties and values in an egalitarian way. So it recommends,
when controversial cases arise about the best detailed form
of democracy, that a consequentialist test be used: Which
decision of these controversial issues seems most conducive
to advancing or protecting these substantive egalitarian
goals? The second approach produces… a detached interpre-
tation or conception of democracy. It insists that we judge
the fairness or democratic character of a political process by
looking to features of that process alone, asking only
whether it distributes political power in an equal way, not
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15 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, p. 328. Since in this section I
am interested in the relationship between democracy, equality and political moral-
ity, in my remarks I will focus only in the last two books.
16 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 13, p. 184.
17 Ibidem, p. 185.
18 Ibidem, p. 186.
what results it promises to produce… So it argues that free-
dom of speech, as well as widespread suffrage, helps to
make political power more equal. And it argues, when con-
troversial questions of detail arise about our political pro-
cess, that these should be resolved by asking which decision
is best calculated to improve equality of political power still
further.
The former “supplies an input test: democracy is essen-
tially a matter of equal distribution of power over political
decisions” and the latter “supplies an output test: democ-
racy is essentially a set of devices for producing results of
the right sort.”19 In spite of the popularity of the detached
conception, Dworkin argues that it cannot be successful in
a pure form and outlines a pure dependent conception,
which provides the most attractive choice. He later pro-
ceeds to illustrate and to test that conception by consider-
ing the important political controversy: “is judicial review
undemocratic?”20 In a few words, judicial review does not
damage the participatory values of democracy, including
the agency goals by allowing “people to participate not
merely as voters but as moral agents”21 and concludes:22
On the contrary, it guards those goals, [i.e. agency goals,] by
giving special protection to freedom of speech and to the
other liberties that nourish moral agency in politics. It does
more: it provides a forum of politics in which citizens may
participate, argumentatively, if they wish, and therefore in a
manner more directly connected to their moral lives than
voting almost ever is. In this forum, moreover, the leverage of
the minorities who have the most negligible leverage in ordi-




20 Ibidem, p. 190.
21 Ibidem, p. 187.
22 Ibidem, p. 209.
Furthermore, in Chapter 10 “Free Speech, Politics, and
the Dimensions of Democracy” he recalls that “Democ-
racy… means government by the people” but it can be un-
derstood in two radically different ways: On one side, for
the “majoritarian conception” it “means government by the
largest number of the people. On this majoritiarian view,
the democratic ideal lies in a match between political deci-
sion and the will of the majority or plurality of opinion.”23
On the other, for the “partnership conception” it “means
government by all the people, acting together as full and
equal partners in a collective enterprise of self-govern-
ment.”24
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23 Ibid., p. 357.
24 Ibid., p. 358. Ronald Dworkin originally characterized the “partnership con-
ception” as “constitutional conception”. Cfr. Dworkin, Ronald, “Introduction: The
Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise”, Freedom’s Law. The Moral Reading of
the American Constitution, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,
1996, pp. 1-38. (There is Spanish version: “La lectura moral y la premisa
mayoritaria”, trans. Imer B. Flores, in Cuestiones Constitucionales. Revista
Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional, No. 7, julio-diciembre, 2002, pp. 3-52.) Ibid.,
p. 17 (p. 25): “If we reject the majoritarian premise, we need a different, better ac-
count of the value and point of democracy… which I call the constitutional concep-
tion of democracy…It denies that it is a defining goal of democracy that collective
decisions always or normally be those that a majority or plurality of citizens would
favor if fully informed and rational. It takes the defining aim of democracy to be a
different one: that collective decisions be made by political institutions whose
structure, composition, and practices treat all members of the community, as indi-
viduals, with equal concern and respect. This alternate account of the aim of de-
mocracy, it is true, demands much the same structure of government as the
majoritarian premise does. It requires that day-to-day political decisions be made
by officials who have been chosen in popular elections. But the constitutional con-
ception requires these majoritarian procedures out of a concern for the equal sta-
tus of citizens, and not out of any commitment to the goals of majority rule. So it of-
fers no reason why some nonmajoritarian procedure should not be employed on
special occasions when this would better protect or enhance the equal status that
it declares to be the essence of democracy, and it does not accept that these excep-
tions are a cause of moral regret. / The constitutional conception of democracy, in
short, takes the following attitude to majoritarian government. Democracy means
government subject to conditions… of equal status for all citizens. When
majoritarian institutions provide and respect the democratic conditions, then the
verdicts of these institutions should be accepted by everyone for that reason. But
when they do not, or when their provision or respect is defective, there can be no
objection, in the name of democracy, to other procedures that protect and respect
them better.”
Dworkin notes one fundamental and relevant difference
between the majoritarian and partnership conceptions of
democracy:25
Citizens play two main roles in a mature democracy. They
are, first, the judges of political contests whose verdicts, ex-
pressed in formal elections or in referenda or other forms of
direct legislation, are normally decisive… Citizens are also,
however, participants in the political contests they judge:
they are candidates and supporters whose actions help, in
different ways, to shape public opinion and to fix how the
rest of the citizens vote. The majoritarian conception of de-
mocracy pays exclusive attention to the first of these roles…
The partnership conception recognizes both roles, because it
supposes that in a true democracy citizens must play a part,
as equal partners in a collective enterprise, in shaping as
well as constituting the public’s opinion.
On the other hand, Dworkin begins Is Democracy Possible
Here? by acknowledging an increasing polarization between
the two dominant cultures in the United States of America,
whom disagree about almost everything including the scope
of their disagreements: “American politics are in an appall-
ing state. We disagree, fiercely, about almost everything. We
disagree about terror and security, social justice, religion in
politics, who is fit to be a judge, and what democracy is.
There are not civil disagreements: each side has no respect
for the other. We are no longer partners in self-government;
our politics are rather a form of war.”26
And even by adding up the implications of considering
the other as a form of enemy and this as a kind of war:27
If the two-cultures view is right, the lack of argument in
American politics is understandable and inevitable. The split
between the two cultures would be an unbridgeable gulf sep-
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25 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 13, p. 358.
26 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?..., supra note 14, p. 1.
27 Ibidem, p. 6.
arating the comprehensive and wholly clashing worldviews of
two Americas. If that is so —if the division between the two
cultures is not just deep but bottomless— then there is no
common ground to be found and no genuine argument to be
had. Politics can only be the kind of war it has become.
Many students of our politics think that that is our situa-
tion, and they may be right. But that would be alarming and
tragic. Democracy can be healthy with no serious political
argument if there is nevertheless a broad consensus about
what is to be done. It can be healthy even if there is no con-
sensus if it does have a culture of argument. But it cannot
remain healthy with deep and bitter divisions and no real ar-
gument, because it then becomes only a tyranny of num-
bers.
Is the depressing diagnosis right? Is there really no com-
mon ground to be found between the trenches of two hostile
political armies? Is no real argument possible?
What’s more, he advances his agenda: although he con-
siders that the diagnosis is chiefly right, it is still possible
to reconcile the two hostile political armies and to have a
real argument, if they can commit to find some shared prin-
ciples. In Dworkin’s voice:28
I shall argue… that in spite of the popular opinion I just de-
scribed, we actually can find shared principles of sufficient
substance to make a national political debate possible and
profitable. These are very abstract, indeed philosophical,
principles about the value and the central responsibilities of
a human life. I suppose not that every American would im-
mediately accept these principles, but that enough Ameri-
cans on both sides of the supposedly unbridgeable divide
would accept them if they took sufficient care to understand
them.
Additionally, by accentuating that in his alternative, in-
stead of considering useless to debate, it is necessary to re-
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28 Ibidem, pp. 6-7.
invigorate the argumentative dimension of politics and as a
consequence it is useful to deliberate and discuss:29
Most people on each side of the division now seem per-
suaded that it is useless to try to argue with or even to un-
derstand the other side… I hope to persuade enough people
that this popular opinion is wrong —that it is profitable to
study our most heated political controversies at a more
philosophical level— to help begin a process that might later
reinvigorate the argumentative dimension of our politics.
III. DWORKIN’S PARTNERSHIP CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY
In order to review Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs and his
take on democracy, partnership and majority rule, it is neces-
sary, briefly, to revisit: first, the concept of democracy; sec-
ond, the two conceptions of democracy; third, the four char-
acterizations of polarization and contrast them to the previ-
ous two conceptions of democracy; and, fourth, the partner-
ship conception of democracy itself.
1. The Concept of Democracy
According to its etymology —demos (people) and kratos
(government, power or rule)— ‘democracy’ means “govern-
ment, power or rule of the people”. It is prima facie a form of
government in contraposition to other forms of government.
The classical typology includes not only three pure forms:
1) “autocracy” (better known as “monarchy”) as the govern-
ment of one —i.e. the monarch; 2) “aristocracy” as the gov-
ernment of few —i.e. the “best-ones”; and 3) “democracy” as
the government of all —i.e. the people.30 But also three im-
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29 Ibidem, p. 8.
30 Hans Kelsen did criticize the traditional classification and its trichotomy,
and distinguished between two types of constitutions: democracy and autocracy.
Vid. Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1945, p. 284: “Democracy
means that the «will» which is represented in the legal order of the State is identical
pure or corrupt forms: 1) “tyranny” as the government of
one —i.e. the tyrant; 2) “oligarchy” as the government of few
—i.e. the “better-off” or rich; and 3) “demagogy” as the gov-
ernment of many (on behalf of all) —i.e. the “worse-off” or
poor (also characterized as the mob).
It is worth to note that Aristotle considered “democracy”
pejoratively, an equivalent to the term “demagogy”, as one
vicious extreme in contraposition to “oligarchy” as the
other vicious extreme, whereas his politeia was the virtu-
ous middle term by comprising the government of the mid-
dle class and as such of both the poor and the rich, i.e. of
both the many and the few.31 Let me explain that I will re-
serve “demagogy” for the impure or corrupt form and “de-
mocracy” for the pure or true one and will assume that the
latter is the government of all the people: not only of both
the poor and the rich but also of both the many and the few
(or alternatively of both the majority and the minority).
The problem is that for some authors “democracy” seems
to be reduced to the government of the many or of the ma-
jority in detriment of the few or of the minority, a so-called
“majoritarian conception of democracy”. On the contrary,
an authentic or true “democracy” and democratic govern-
ment must be neither of poor or rich, nor of many or few,
nor of majority or minority, but of all: both of poor and rich,
both of many and few, both of majority and minority, what
Dworkin labels as “partnership conception of democracy”.32
So far the notion of “democracy” as a form of government
and the typology has served to emphasize the ownership
—or partnership— “of” the political or sovereign power, de-
pending on whether it corresponds to one, few, many, or
all. Nevertheless, the exercise of this political or sovereign
(legitimate) power not only must be done directly and indi-
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with the wills of the subjects. Its opposite is the bondage of autocracy. There the
subjects are excluded from the creation of the legal order, and harmony between
the order and their wills is in no way guaranteed.”
31 Aristotle, The Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988, IV, 11,
1295b, pp. 97-98.
32 Vid. supra note 24.
rectly “by” its (legitimate) owners —or partners— and their
(legitimate) representatives, but also must be done “for”
them and their (legitimate) benefit, not in their (illegitimate)
detriment. The three ideas already sketched can be put to-
gether into an integral definition of democracy, such as the
one embodied in Abraham Lincoln’s maxim and in the Fifth
French Republic’s motto: “government of the people, by the
people, and for the people”.33
In that sense, an authentic or true “democracy” must be
the government of, by and for all the people: poor and rich,
many and few… men and women, heterosexuals and homo-
sexuals, believers and non-believers... majority and minor-
ity, and so on. Hence, “democracy” is “government of all the
people, by all the people —directly on their own (“direct de-
mocracy”) or indirectly through their representatives (“rep-
resentative democracy”)— and for all the people”.34
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33 Vid. Lincoln, Abraham, “The Gettysbury Address, November 19, 1863, in Lin-
coln on Democracy, New York, Harper Collins, 1990, p. 308: “government of the
people, by the people, for the people”. (The emphasis is added.) Vid. also Article 2
(6) of the French Fifth Republic Constitution: “Its principle is government of the
people, by the people and for the people.” (The emphasis is added.) Cfr. Dworkin,
Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, p. 379 (warning that in democracy talk: “We
are soon knee-deep in slogans. Only democracy can provide dignity. Government
must be of the people, by the people and for the people. The people must govern
themselves. Each citizen must be offered an equal and meaningful role. One per-
son must have one vote and no one more than one vote...”).
34 Vid. Flores, Imer B., “Heráclito vis-à-vis Parménides: Cambio y permanencia
como la principal función del derecho en una democracia incipiente”, in Molina
Piñeiro, Luis J. et al. (eds.), Funciones del derecho en las democracias incipientes.
El caso de México, México, Porrúa and Facultad de Derecho, UNAM, 2005, pp.
154-157; “Actores, procesos e instituciones democráticas: Hacia una verdadera
democracia en México”, in Molina Piñeiro, Luis J. et al. (eds.), Instituciones,
Actores y Procesos Democráticos en México 2007, México, Porrúa and Facultad de
Derecho, UNAM, 2008, pp. 314-319; “¿Es posible la democracia en México?”, in
Molina Piñeiro, Luis J. et al. (eds.), ¿Polarización en las expectativas democráticas
de México 2008-2009? Presidencialismo, Congreso de la Unión, órganos electorales,
pluripartidismo y liderazgo, México, Porrúa, Facultad de Derecho-UNAM, Instituto
de Derechos Humanos “Bartolomé de las Casas”-Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
y COPUEX, 2009, pp. 471-495; “Sobre los triunfos del proceso democratizador en
México: A propósito del movimiento anulacionista y del voto nulo”, in Molina
Piñeiro, Luis J. et al. (eds.), Balance en el proceso democratizador de México 1988-
2009, México, Porrúa, Facultad de Derecho-UNAM, Instituto de Derechos
Humanos “Bartolomé de las Casas”-Universidad Carlos III de Madrid y COPUEX,
2009, pp. 744-764; and “Democracia y polarización: ¿(in)compatibilidad?”, in Díaz
2. Two Conceptions of Democracy
However, since the concept of democracy is an interpre-
tive and much contested one,35 there are at least two com-
peting and conflicting conceptions of democracy, i.e. the
majoritarian and the partnership, which attempt to answer
the question: “Who are the people?” As far as I know this
distinction can be traced all the way back to John Stuart
Mill, who —almost one-hundred and fifty years ago— in his
Considerations on Representative Government, in 1861, un-
der the epigraph “Of True and False Democracy: Represen-
tation of All, and Representation of the Majority Only”, indi-
cated:36
Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the
name democracy. The pure idea of democracy, according to
its definition, is the government of the whole people by the
whole people, equally represented. Democracy as commonly
conceived and hitherto practiced is the government of the
whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively
represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of
all citizens; the latter, strangely confounded with it, is a
government of privilege, in favor of the numerical majority,
who alone possess practically any voice in the State. This is
the inevitable consequence of the manner in which the
votes are now taken, to the complete disfranchisement of
minorities.
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Müller, Luis T. (ed.), V Jornadas: Crisis y derechos humanos, México, Instituto de
Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, 2010, pp. 97-116.
35 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, p. 379.
36 Mill, John Stuart, Considerations on Representative Government, Indianapo-
lis, The Liberal Arts Press, 1958, pp. 102-103. (There is Spanish version:
Consideraciones sobre el gobierno representativo, trans. Antonio Guzmán Balboa,
México, Herrero Hermanos, 1966, pp. 120-121).
In Dworkin’s perspective, at the present time, the two
competing conceptions of democracy not only coexist but
also are still in conflict:37
The two views of democracy that are in contest are these. Ac-
cording to the majoritarian view, democracy is government by
majority will, that is, in accordance with the will of the great-
est number of people, expressed in elections with universal
or near universal suffrage. There is no guarantee that a ma-
jority will decide fairly; its decisions may be unfair to minori-
ties whose interests the majority systematically ignores. If
so, then the democracy is unjust but no less democratic for
that reason. According to the rival partnership view of de-
mocracy, however, democracy means that the people govern
themselves each as a full partner in a collective political en-
terprise so that a majority’s decisions are democratic only
when certain further conditions are met that protect the sta-
tus and interests of each citizen as a full partner in that en-
terprise. On the partnership view, a community that steadily
ignores the interests of some minority or other group is just
for that reason not democratic even though it elects officials
by impeccably majoritarian means. This is only a very
sketchy account of the partnership conception, however. If
we find the more familiar majoritarian conception unsatis-
factory, we shall have to develop the partnership view in
more detail.
Actually, as he acknowledges, the United States of Amer-
ica is neither a pure example of the majoritarian conception
of democracy nor of the non-majoritarian (or partnership)
one. Although the bipartisan system and the majority prin-
ciple reinforce the former, since the founding fathers lim-
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37 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?..., supra note 14, p. 131. Vid.
Waluchow, W. J., A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review. The Living Tree, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 106-109. Vid. also Flores, Imer B.,
“The Living Tree: Fixity and Flexibility. A General Theory of (Judicial Review in a)
Constitutional Democracy?”, Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho,
No. 2, 2008, pp. 285-305; and Flores, Imer B., “The Living Tree Constitutionalism:
Fixity and Flexibility”, Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, No. 3,
2009, pp. 37-74.
ited the power of the majorities in various forms, by includ-
ing anti-majoritarian devices, which were latter reinforced
by other institutions, such as the filibuster and the judicial
review (of the constitutionality) of the acts of the other
(elected) branches of government, it can be said that they
also supported the latter.38
On one side, a minority of either thirty-four or forty-one
(out of the one-hundred senators) can block the majority of
bringing a decision to a final vote, depending on whether it
is a substantive or procedural issue. And, on the other, the
power of the political majorities is limited by the recognition
of individual constitutional rights that legislative majorities
cannot infringe and much less step over. Aside, Dworkin
alerts that the degraded state of the public debate endan-
gers the partnership conception of democracy and strength-
ens the majoritarian one, including viewing the other as an
enemy and politics as a war:39
If we aim to be a partnership democracy… the degraded
state of our political argument does count as a serious defect
in our democracy because mutual attention and respect are
the essence of partnership. We do not treat someone with
whom we disagree as a partner —we treat him as an enemy
or at best as an obstacle— when we make no effort either to
understand the force of his contrary views or to develop our
own opinions in a way that makes them responsive to his.
The partnership model so described seems unattainable now
because it is difficult to see how Americans on rival sides of
the supposed culture wars could come to treat each other
with that mutual respect and attention.
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38 Vid. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?..., supra note 14, pp. 135 and
137. In fact, the existence of the Senate was designed to divide the most dangerous
branch of government and to give stability to the government by protecting the mi-
norities against a speedy and unreflected legislative majority in the House of Rep-
resentatives.
39 Ibidem, pp. 132-133.
3. Four Characterizations of Polarization
Since the term ‘polarization’ is ambiguous and as such
considered either as an activity-process or product-result
(of such activity-process) we must stipulate our use of
them, accordingly we are going to reserve the verb ‘polarize’
to the activity-process and ‘polarization’ for the product-re-
sult. On one side, ‘polarize’ means to “cause division of
opinion: to make the differences between groups or ideas
ever more clear-cut and extreme, hardening the opposition
between them, or become ever more clear-cut and extreme
in this way.” On the other, ‘polarization’ means “concentra-
tion, as of groups, forces, or interests, about two conflicting
or contrasting positions” and of which a rational concilia-
tion seems highly or near to impossible (for example, be-
tween those for and against: abortion, death penalty, eu-
thanasia, same-sex marriage, and so on). By the same
token, the polarization describes the formation of antago-
nistic (social) classes or groups and its confrontation (verbi
gratia: bourgeois-proletariat, capitalist-socialists, conserva-
tive-liberal, democrat-republican, left-right, moderate-radi-
cal, poor-rich, rural-urban, and so on).
Anyway, we can distinguish between two great options
regarding polarization: (1) exclusion of one group by the
other or (2) inclusion of one group by the other. Similarly,
each option can be further divided into two theses: one
strong and other weak. On one side, in case of exclusion:
(A) the strong version is characterized by the elimination or
suppression of the “different”, especially if “dissident”,
which is considered as an “enemy”, i.e. ethnic cleansing or
mass deportation, and may lead to an “authoritarian or to-
talitarian imposition-restoration”; and (B) the weak version
is depicted by the division, excision, fragmentation, seces-
sion, or separation into two or more parts, which are not
willing to cooperate, i.e. balkanization for short, and may
lead to a “libertarian emancipation”. On the other, in case
of inclusion: (C) the strong version is illustrated by the agi-
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tation, convulsion, or tension between majorities-minorities
and may lead to a “mayoritarian —or minoritarian—
tyrannization”;40 and (D) the weak version is portrayed by
the deliberation, discussion, participation or representation
of all partners and may lead to a (pure or true) “democratic
association”.
From the preceding lines, it is possible to derive four dif-
ferent characterizations of ‘polarization’: two of which are
openly incompatible with any conception of democracy —(A)
and (B); and, two of which are presumably compatible with
democracy: one with the majoritarian conception (C); and,
other with the partnership conception (D). Since there is not
much of democratic in (A) and (B), we will analyze only the
two versions presumably compatible with democracy in
the search for the one that is purely or truly so. In (C) po-
larization is recognized not only as the oppression of mi-
norities by majorities but also as the opposition of minori-
ties against majorities to the extent that it is coherent with
the majoritarian conception. On the contrary, in (D) polariza-
tion is renowned as the association between both majorities
and minorities to the extent that it is consistent with the
partnership conception.
Nowadays, we tend to attribute to polarization a negative
connotation, but democracy has not necessarily a positive
one, keep in mind Winston Churchill’s speech where he
characterized democracy as a “lesser evil” in the contin-
uum: “Many forms of government have been tried, and will
be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that
democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said
that democracy is the worst form of government except all
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40 Elsewhere we have characterized these different situations as
“majoritycracy”, i.e. “government of the majority”; and, as “minoritycracy” (i.e.
“government of the minority”); and even as “partycracy”, i.e. “government of politi-
cal parties”). Vid. Flores, “Heráclito vis-à-vis Parménides…”, supra note 34, p. 159;
and Flores, “Actores, procesos e instituciones democráticas…”, supra note 34, pp.
338-339.
those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.41
Let me elucidate, I am trying to suggest that it may be the
case that at least one form of polarization is a “lesser evil”
for democracy than other tendencies, including those of
“non-polarization”. Therefore, following Dworkin, I not only
conceive polarization as an opportunity for democracy and
not necessarily as the problem in itself but also perceive
that the partnership conception of democracy is better
suited than the majoritarian one to deal with polarization,
since the former (D) by facing polarization ends up decreas-
ing or reducing it, while the latter (C) either by avoiding or
confronting polarization winds up increasing or even multi-
plying it, and what’s more —and worse— may lead to (A)
and/or (B).42
4. The Partnership Conception of Democracy
First and foremost, Dworkin is adamant in his critique of
“a supposedly neutral account of democracy: democracy is
government according to the will of the majority expressed
in reasonably frequent elections with nearly full suffrage af-
84
IMER B. FLORES
41 Vid. Churchill, Winston, “Parliament Bill. Speech on the House of Commons,
November 11, 1947”, The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3a. ed., Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1979, p. 150.
42 To illustrate how the majoritarian conception may lead either to the elimina-
tion and suppression of the “different”, especially if “dissident”, which is consid-
ered as an “enemy”, or to the division, excision, fragmentation, secession, and sep-
aration into two or more parts, which are not willing to cooperate, I will like to
point, following Linda C. McClain, to Muriel Barbery’s The Elegance of the Hedge-
hog best seller novel: Vid., Barbery, Muriel, The Elegance of the Hedgehog, trans.
Alison Henderson, New York, Europa Editions, 2008. (Original title and publica-
tion: L’élegance du hérison, Paris, Gallimard, 2006.) Vid., for example, on the one
hand, ibid., p. 84: “life is a permanent battle where you can only win be destroying
the other guy… A world where there’s room for other people is a dangerous world.”
And, on the other hand, ibid., p. 32: “Politics… A toy for little rich kids that they
won’t let anyone else play with.” I am grateful to Linda C. McClain not only for
pointing out some of the parallelisms between Barbery’s and Dworkin’s books but
also for recommending the novel to me. Vid. McClain, Linda, “Justice and Elegance
for Hedgehogs —In Life, Law, and Literature”, in “Symposium…”, supra note 1, pp.
863-902.
ter political debate with free speech and a free press.”43
Furthermore, he challenges whether: “Is democracy, under-
stood as majority rule, something valuable in itself?” And
even questions: “Why should the fact that numerically more
people favor one course of action over another signal that
the more favored policy is either fairer or better?”.44
To prove his point, i.e. majority rule is not intrinsically
fair in all circumstances, Dworkin recognizes “We might
say: when people locked in a joint enterprise disagree about
what should be done, the only fair solution is to count
heads. But that must be rejected as a universal default
principle of fair play: it is not automatically true.”45 For that
purpose, he reintroduces a “hoary philosophical example”:46
When a lifeboat is overcrowded and one passenger must go
overboard to save the rest, majority vote would seem close to
the worst method of choosing the victim. Personal attach-
ments and antagonisms would play a role they should not
play, and so a lottery would be much superior. Those attach-
ments and antagonisms spoil politics as well, but on a much
larger scale, and this makes the idea that majority vote is in-
trinsically or automatically fair in that context seem at least
dubious.
And in slightly different terms:47
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43 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, pp. 347-348.
44 Ibidem, p. 348.
45 Idem.
46 Idem. Dworkin introduces the example in Is Democracy Possible Here?..., su-
pra note 14, p. 139: “Suppose passengers are trapped in a lifeboat on the high seas
that will sink unless one person —any person— jumps or is thrown overboard. How
shall the group decide who is to be sacrificed? It seems perfectly fair to draw straws
or in some other way to let fate decide. That gives each person the same chances of
staying alive. Letting the group vote, however, seems a very bad idea because kin-
ship, friendships, enmities, jealousies, and other forces that should not make a dif-
ference will then be decisive. We use lotteries to make some fateful political deci-
sions as well. When we draft soldiers, we do not hold referendums on who should
be drafted. We choose by lot. Perhaps we should make more use of chance in poli-
tics. The Athenians selected their leaders by lot, and it is not vividly clear that the
quality of our legislators would decline if we chose them in the same way.”
47 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, p. 387.
[W]hen a lifeboat is overcrowded and one passenger must be
thrown over else all will die, it would not be fair to hold a
vote so that the least popular among them would be
drowned. It would be much fairer to draw lots.
Dworkin reinforces his point with a rhetorical question
that is quite revealing: “But if democracy means majority
rule, and majority rule is not something desirable in itself,
then why should we care so much to protect our democ-
racy?”.48 In a nutshell, his main claim is that majority rule
—which is closely tied to democracy as its criteria— is not
necessarily intrinsically fair or valuable,49 but democracy is
and must be. Accordingly, he rejects that democracy, as
well as equality and liberty, are “criterial concepts that can
be explicated through some neutral analysis that makes no
assumption about their value or importance.” Instead, he
intends “to show why it is so important to understand that
these are interpretative concepts.”50
In that sense, Dworkin embarks himself in the quest for
“A Better Program” by reaffirming: “We do better when we
accept that the familiar concepts of political virtue are in-
terpretive concepts.”51 In addition, in Is Democracy Possible
Here? he insisted that democracy cannot be reduced to a
procedural ideal as the majoritarian conception purports
but to a substantive one as the partnership conception pro-
claims:52
The majoritarian conception purports to be purely proce-
dural and therefore independent of other dimensions of po-
litical morality; it allows us to say, as I indicated, that a deci-
sion is democratic even if it is very unjust. But the
partnership conception does not make democracy independ-
ent of the rest of political morality; on that conception we
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48 Ibidem, p. 348.
49 Idem: “intrinsically good about it”.
50 Ibidem, p. 345.
51 Ibidem, p. 349.
52 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?..., supra note 14, p. 134.
need a theory a theory of equal partnership to decide what is
or is not a democratic decision, and we need to consult ideas
about justice, equality, and liberty in order to construct such
a theory. So on the partnership conception, democracy is a
substantive, not a merely procedural, ideal.
Hence, he develops a substantive conception of commu-
nity intertwined with democracy, equality and liberty:53
In such a community, the distribution of political power
must reflect both these principles: the structure and deci-
sions of government must acknowledge both people’s equal
importance and their personal responsibility. A conception of
democracy is a conception of how that challenge is best met
through political structures and practices. Because we aim
to interpret our two principles as mutually supporting, not
conflicting, we must try to develop conceptions of equality,
liberty, and democracy that support one another as well.
Since he has already developed the conception of equality
as “equality of resources” and “equal concern” at length in
Sovereign Virtue54 and elsewhere, ever since the appearance
of his book review of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in
1973 and of Taking Rights Seriously in 1977,55 we will pro-
ceed directly to his development of the conception of liberty,
which is —and has been— present at the heart of his over-
all argument for equality as part of a “Trojan horse” strat-
egy. Actually, in Taking Rights Seriously, he advanced:56
The central concept of my argument will be the concept not
of liberty but of equality. I presume that we all accept the fol-
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53 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, pp. 349-350. Cfr. Dworkin,
Ronald, “Liberal Community”, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 13, pp. 211-236. (There
is Spanish version: La comunidad liberal, trans. Claudia Montilla, Bogotá, Siglo del
Hombre Editores, 1996).
54 Vid. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 13, pp.1-3, 6-7, 12-14, 122-123,
and 139-141.
55 Vid. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 4, pp. 180-183 and pp.
272-278.
56 Ibidem, pp. 272-273.
lowing postulates of political morality. Government must
treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human
beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with
respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming
and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives
should be lived. Government must not only treat people with
concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect. It
must not distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the
ground that some citizens are entitled to more because they
are worthy of more concern. It must not constrain liberty on
the ground that one citizen’s conception of the good life of
one group is nobler or superior to another’s. These predi-
cates taken together, state what might be called the liberal
conception of equality; but it is a conception of equality, not
of liberty as license…
In that sense, Dworkin recalls that liberty is an “interpre-
tive concept” and that “there are not one but two interpretive
concepts of liberty”, which he traces to two essays making
such claim: “Benjamin Constant’s The Liberty of the An-
cients and the Liberty of the Moderns, and Isaiah Berlin’s
Two Concepts of Liberty”:57
The argument they make in different ways seems plausible,
and it has been very widely accepted among political philos-
ophers and thoughtful lawyers... We must distinguish two
very different questions. Both assume that government, at
least of and by human beings, is inevitably coercive. The first
asks: By whom —and with whom— should I be coerced? The
second asks: How much should I be coerced?
A political theory calls for positive liberty if it insists, in re-
sponse to the first question, that people must be permitted
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57 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, pp. 364-365. (Emphasis is
original and footnote is omitted.) Vid. Constant, Benjamin, “De la liberté des
anciens comparée àcelle des modernes”, in Collection Complète des Ouvrages,
París, Béchet Libraire, 1820; and Berlin, Isaiah, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Four
Essays on Liberty, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 118-172. (Originally
published: 1958.) Vid. also Flores, Imer B., “Los dos conceptos de libertad:
¿Competición o colaboración?”, in Sergio Sarmiento (coord.), Tercer Concurso de
Ensayo “Caminos de la Libertad”. Memorias, México, Grupo Salinas y Fundación
Azteca, 2009, pp. 199-213.
to play a role in their own coercive governance: that govern-
ment must in some sense or another be self-government. A
theory calls for negative liberty if it insists, in response to the
second question, that people must be free of coercive govern-
ment over some substantial range of their decisions and ac-
tivities. Both these ideas —of positive and negative liberty—
are initially puzzling. How can coercive government by a
group larger than a single person be self-government for ev-
eryone? If coercive government is legitimate at all, then how
can we carve out some area of decision and activity that gov-
ernment has no right to regulate?
He later remembers that his second principle of dignity
provides an answer to such questions: “People must be al-
lowed responsibility for their own lives, and… that respon-
sibility is compatible with governance by others only when
certain conditions are met.” And such conditions are:58
First, everyone must be permitted to participate in the right
way in the collective decisions that make up his governance,
and second, everyone must be left free from collective deci-
sion in matters that his personal responsibility demands he
decide for himself. Because responsibility has those two di-
mensions, so does liberty. A theory of positive liberty stipu-
lates what it means for people to participate in the right way.
It offers, that is, a conception of self-government. A theory of
negative liberty describes which choices must be exempt
from collective decisions if personal responsibility is to be
preserved.
In my opinion, Dworkin argues both for the compatibility
between the two liberties and for the priority of the negative
over the positive liberty. Accordingly, for him, in a democ-
racy as a conception of self-government: (1) the people must
be allowed personal responsibility for their own lives, and
such responsibility is compatible with governance by others
or political responsibility only when certain conditions are
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58 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, p. 365.
met; and (2) those conditions include certain choices that
must be exempt from collective decision if personal respon-
sibility is to be preserved and to be taken seriously.59
IV. COMMENT TO JEREMY WALDRON’S “A MAJORITY
IN THE LIFEBOAT”
In this section, we will reconsider not only the critical re-
sistance produced by Waldron in his article “A Majority in
the Lifeboat” to Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs and part-
nership conception of democracy but also the response pro-
vided by Dworkin himself. However, since it may appear in-
sufficient we will try to present an alternative —or
complementary— riposte in order to meet Waldron’s chal-
lenge.
1. Waldron’s Resistance
Jeremy Waldron —right from the start of his critical es-
say— affirms: “[Dworkin] is not a fan of the principle of
majority-decision”60 and “[H]e says he believes in democ-
racy, but he is not enthusiastic about any version of de-
mocracy that is defined by the use of majority-decision.”61
The question seems to be quite straight: How come? How
can someone be committed to democracy and not be com-
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59 This two-fold argument is necessary to respond to Waldron’s challenge. Vid.
infra note 95 (and accompanying text).
60 Waldron, Jeremy, “A Majority in the Lifeboat”, in “Symposium…”, supra note
1, p. 1043. Additionally, Waldron advances in footnote 1: “I will not follow Dworkin
in characterizing the relevant principle as «majority rule,» for reasons stated by
Hannah Arendt: «Only where the majority, after the decision has been taken, pro-
ceeds to liquidate politically… the opposing minority, does the technical device of
majority decision degenerate into majority rule.»”Id., footnote 1 (the reference is
omitted).
My gut feeling is that Dworkin’s use of the expression “majority rule” is not lim-
ited to such characterization of a corrupt, degenerated or impure form of “majority
decision”, and so we can assume that “majority decision”, “majority rule”, and even
“majority vote”, can be used interchangeably.
61 Waldron, “A Majority in the Lifeboat”, supra note 60, pp. 1043-1044.
mitted to majority-decision? The answer can also be
straight away: majority-decision is neither a necessary nor
sufficient condition for democracy. Actually, Waldron does
grant it: “Of course, majority-decision is not necessarily
democratic.”62 However, since Dworkin has been advocating
throughout this book and most of his work for an interpre-
tive (or anti-criterialist) approach, his answer has to be
slightly different: democracy cannot be reduced to any cri-
teria and much less to the majority-decision criterion.
In addition, Waldron asserts “Dworkin believes that
strong judicial review is compatible with democracy, but of
course, this is not because judges use majority-decision.”63
The question seems to be again: How come? How can some-
one, on the one hand, be committed to democracy and
strong judicial review and, on the other hand, not be com-
mitted to majority-decision, but accept its exercise or use.
In that sense, he insists by recalling: “It has been more
than twenty years since I began challenging defenders of
judicial review to explain the use of the majority-principle
by courts exercising «counter-majoritarian» judicial review; I
have long since given up any expectation of an honorable
answer.”64 Providing such “honorable answer” is the main
aim of Dworkin’s response and of our own alternative —or
complementary— riposte.65
In his paper, Waldron comes to terms with Dworkin’s
“hoary philosophical example” considering that it is in-
tended to be “a knockdown argument against the view that
majority decision is fair.”66 In addition, he suggests, on one
side, hesitantly in a footnote: “Perhaps it has something (a
little) in common with Fuller’s example of the explorers
trapped in a cave who drew lots to eat one of their num-
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62 Ibidem, p. 1044.
63 Idem.
64 Idem.
65 Vid. infra, IV. 2. & 3.
66 Ibidem, p. 1045.
ber.”67 On the other, decisively both in the text: “I suppose
it owes something to United States v. Holmes —a
well-known case from 1842 in which fourteen passengers
were thrown overboard from a lifeboat in danger of sink-
ing”;68 and, in a footnote: “I suppose one might also cite R.
v. Dudley & Stevens… (finding crew of shipwreck guilty of
murder where they killed and ate their cabin boy in order to
survive). Dworkin’s casual reference to a «cabin boy»… hints
in this direction”.69
Waldron is absolutely right in the connection between
both Holmes and Dudley & Stevens with Dworkin’s example
and —despite his hesitation— with Fuller’s explorers.70
There are at least two grounds for the later claim: 1) the
temporary edition of The Problems of Jurisprudence by Lon
L. Fuller, where “The Case of the Speluncean Explorers” ap-
pears for the first time in printed form includes a “Note” by
Fuller himself: “This case was suggested by Queen v.
Dudley and Stephens…; and United States v. Holmes…”;71
and 2) the Spanish translation of “The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers” incorporates a “Preliminary Note” by
Genaro R. Carrió: “The facts of this imaginary case are not
totally imaginary. Fuller affirms that the facts were sug-
gested to him by Queen v. Dudley and Stephens… and
United States v. Holmes…”.72
Anyway, Waldron proceeds later not only to analyze and
criticize the discussion of methods of choice found in
92
IMER B. FLORES
67 Ibidem, p. 1045, footnote 12 (the reference is omitted).
68 Ibidem, p. 1045.
69 Ibidem, pp. 1045-1046, footnote 13 (the reference is omitted).
70 Vid. Fuller, Lon L., “The Case of the Speluncean Explorers”, 62 Harvard Law
Review, 616 (1949).
71 Vid. Fuller, Lon L. The Problems of Jurisprudence, Brooklyn, The Foundation
Press, 1949, p. 27.
72 Vid. Carrió, Genaro R., “Nota preliminar”, in Fuller, Lon L., El caso de los
exploradores de cavernas, trans. Genaro R. Carrió, Buenos Aires, Abeledo-Perrot,
1961, p. 5: “Los hechos de este caso imaginario no son totalmente imaginarios.
Fuller afirma que le fueron sugeridos por Queen vs. Dudley and Stephens (L.R. 14
Q. B. Div. 273; 1884) y por United States vs. Holmes (1 Wall. 1; 1842).”
Holmes,73 but also to scrutinize: “What is Dworkin’s exam-
ple supposed to show?”.74 For that purpose he ranks four
possible conclusions (ranked according to him from stron-
gest to weakest):75
(1) It is silly to think that majority-decision is intrinsically
fair or intrinsically valuable.
(2) It is not the case that majority-decision is ever intrin-
sically fair or intrinsically valuable.
(3) Majority-decision is not intrinsically fair or intrinsi-
cally valuable in all circumstances.
(4) Majority-decision is not intrinsically fair or intrinsi-
cally valuable in circumstances just like the life boat
example.
And, finally, correlates them to Dworkin’s main conclu-
sion:76
(5) A definition that ties the term firmly to majority-deci-
sion is an unhelpful misconception of democracy.
In short, Waldron is quite skeptical that the lifeboat ex-
ample can either establish anything strong as conclusions
(1) and (2), which might lay a foundation for (5);77 or get us
to conclusions (3) and (4), and lay a foundation for (5).78
Considering that justice has not been done to the lifeboat
example, he tries one (or several) more pass(es). For that
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73 Waldron, “A Majority in the Lifeboat”, supra note 60, pp. 1046-1047.
74 Ibidem, p. 1048.
75 Ibidem, pp. 1048-1049.
76 Ibidem, p. 1049.
77 Idem: “[I]f the lifeboat example established conclusion (1) or conclusion (2), it
might conceivably lay a foundation for (5), i.e., for this broader claim about how to
think and how not think about democracy. But it is not clear how the lifeboat ex-
ample can establish anything that strong.”
78 Ibidem, p. 1050: “But it is not at all clear that we can extrapolate from the in-
appropriateness of using majority-decision in the lifeboat to the inappropriateness
of associating democracy with, say, the democratic of representatives or the demo-
cratic basis of legislation. I think is arguable that the lifeboat example gets us to
conclusion (3) or (4). But there remains a huge gulf fixed between those conclu-
sions and the further conclusion (5), which is what Dworkin is really interested in.”
purpose, he distinguishes, first, between “choices about
particulars and choices about general issues of policy and
principle”,79 and, later, following Dworkin, between “per-
sonal” and “external” preferences.80 On the one hand, he
brings to mind: “But at most, Dworkin has discredited ma-
jority-decision as a procedure for making particular life and
death choices of for [sic] individuals and has (tendentiously)
discredited majority-decision in the choice of the proper
ambit of the majority-principle itself. Since these uses of
the majority-principle are so marginal, it is hard to see that
they get us anywhere remotely near to (5).”81 And, similarly,
on the other hand, he calls to mind:82
[T]he external preferences point… was not supposed to show
the inappropriateness of majority-decision making (or utili-
tarian calculation) in general. It was supposed to show its in-
appropriateness in a limited range of cases. And that is what
the lifeboat example might illustrate: It offers us an instance
of a strange sort of case in which any enthusiasm we might
have for majority-decision might be qualified (for certain
odds kinds of case). That’s conclusion (4) above. But that
won’t get us to (5); it doesn’t establish the inappropriateness
of majoritarianism in general, let alone the “silliness” of as-
sociating it with democracy.
Finally, Waldron, on one side, regrets that Dworkin “did
not take the trouble to relate the lifeboat example (and
what he draws from it) to the broader considerations of po-
litical equality that are widely believed to give majority-prin-
ciple whatever plausibility it has as a principle of political
decision.”83 And, on the other, reckons “The lifeboat exam-
ple adds nothing to that discussion… I fear that its con-
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79 Ibidem, pp. 1050-1052.
80 Ibidem, pp. 1053-1054.
81 Ibidem, p. 1052.
82 Ibidem, p. 1054.
83 Idem.
stant introduction into the discussion of democracy by
Dworkin and others is little more than a distraction.”84
2. Dworkin’s Response
Firstly, Dworkin clarifies that his main “point” is not, as
Waldron says, to reject a definition of democracy that “ties
the term firmly to majority-decision” but “rather to reject
any definition that «ties» democracy «firmly» to any specifi-
cation.”85 Especially, since that will amount “to treat de-
mocracy as criterial”, when he wants to treat it as an “inter-
pretive concept” and the “majoritarian conception is
certainly an eligible one, even though… unsuccessful.”86
Secondly, Dworkin explains that he intends to make with
the lifeboat example “a very limited and highly circum-
scribed point: only that the majoritarian decision principle
is not, as he [i.e. Waldron] has claimed it to be, a general
principle of fairness independent of context —that is, «in-
trinsically» fair process.”87 He further elucidates that it is
not a “knock-down” argument against a majoritarian con-
ception of democracy: “This is most certainly not an argu-
ment, however, that majority rule is never a fair method of
decision. On the contrary, I insist that it is appropriate in
politics when conditions of legitimacy are.”88
In a summary, Dworkin provides two reasons to reject
the majoritarian conception of democracy: 1) the concept of
democracy is interpretive and hence is not firmly tied to
any criteria or specification, much less to the majority-deci-
sion that is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition;
and, 2) the majority principle is not an intrinsically fair pro-
cess, but that does not mean that is never a fair method of
decision.
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84 Ibidem, p. 1057.
85 Dworkin, Ronald, “Response”, in “Symposium…”, supra note 1, p. 1084.
86 Ibidem, p. 1085.
87 Idem.
88 Idem.
Thirdly, Dworkin attempts to provide “an honorable an-
swer” to the question that Waldron has been asking for
twenty years: “Why, if majority rule is not intrinsically fair,
is it appropriate on final appellate courts like the Supreme
Court, which decides many very important cases by a 5-4
vote?”.89 A part of his response was already there: although
the majority principle is not an intrinsically fair process, it
does not mean that it is never a fair method of decision. Ac-
tually, he tried to justify the appropriateness of majority
rule as a check on majoritarian procedure and insisted by
repeating:90
The choice among checks on majoritarian procedures must
of course depend on which options are available. Judicial re-
view is an available option for checking legislative and exec-
utive decisions. It is also an available option for checking ju-
dicial review itself through a hierarchical system of appellate
courts. But of course judicial review is not available to check
the decision of the highest appellate court; if it were the
court would not be the highest.
This response echoes the one provide in the “Introduc-
tion” to Freedom’s Law:91
If we reject the majoritarian premise, we need a different,
better account of the value and point of democracy… which I
call the constitutional conception of democracy…It denies
that it is a defining goal of democracy that collective deci-
sions always or normally be those that a majority or plurality
of citizens would favor if fully informed and rational. It takes
the defining aim of democracy to be a different one: that col-
lective decisions be made by political institutions whose
structure, composition, and practices treat all members of
the community, as individuals, with equal concern and re-
spect. This alternate account of the aim of democracy, it is
true, demands much the same structure of government as
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89 Ibidem, p. 1086.
90 Idem.
91 Dworkin, “Introduction…”, supra note 24, p. 17.
the majoritarian premise does. It requires that day-to-day
political decisions be made by officials who have been cho-
sen in popular elections. But the constitutional conception
requires these majoritarian procedures out of a concern for
the equal status of citizens, and not out of any commitment
to the goals of majority rule. So it offers no reason why some
nonmajoritarian procedure should not be employed on spe-
cial occasions when this would better protect or enhance the
equal status that it declares to be the essence of democracy,
and it does not accept that these exceptions are a cause of
moral regret.
The constitutional conception of democracy, in short,
takes the following attitude to majoritarian government. De-
mocracy means government subject to conditions… of equal
status for all citizens. When majoritarian institutions provide
and respect the democratic conditions, then the verdicts of
these institutions should be accepted by everyone for that
reason. But when they do not, or when their provision or re-
spect is defective, there can be no objection, in the name of
democracy, to other procedures that protect and respect
them better.
In addition, he reintroduces —following Waldron’s sug-
gestive critique— a distinction “between people’s prefer-
ences about their own lives and their preferences about
what should happen to other people”, i.e. between personal
(or internal) and (political or) external preferences, “to ex-
plain why a majoritarian process with no judicial or other
check is not well suited to produce unbiased results.”92 He
further recognizes: “I could only use the distinction in this
context to suggest that majoritarian politics should be qual-
ified not abandoned” and to conclude: “Majoritarian proce-
dures are appropriate —indeed sometimes necessary— in
circumstances when they are fair. Judicial review is among
the arrangements that might improve their fairness though,
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92 Dworkin, “Response”, in “Symposium…”, supra note 1, p. 1086. Dworkin in-
troduced the distinction in Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 4, pp. 234-238.
as I emphasize, it is not the only such arrangement.”93 In
sum, Dworkin’s response succeeded to indicate that major-
ity decisions, including judicial review, are appropriate in
circumstances when they are fair, but failed to insinuate
when it was the case.
3. Alternative —or Complementary— Riposte
Since Dworkin’s response to Waldron’s resistance was
more or less the same in the oral reply that preceded the
written one, nothing suggests that he will be completely
persuaded or pleased by it;94 and, thus, I intend to present
an alternative —or complementary— riposte.
First and foremost, let me intimate that Dworkin in his
response to Waldron did answer fully to two questions but
felt short from answering to a third: Are majority decisions
appropriate? Yes, majority decisions are appropriate…
When? …in circumstances when they are fair. But did not
respond to: When are they fair? I guess at this point his an-
swer must have been something like: Majority decisions are
appropriate in circumstances when they are fair; they can
only be fair when certain conditions are met; and such con-
ditions incorporate certain choices that must be exempt
from collective decision.95 But, again, which are the choices
that must be exempted from majority decision? Providing
an “honorable answer” to Waldron’s challenge by respond-
ing to this last question is the aim of the following riposte.
Waldron is right in saying that Dworkin is not a fan of
the principle of “majority decision”, “majority rule”, and
“majority vote”, because for him the principle is not intrin-
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93 Dworkin, “Response”, in “Symposium…”, supra note 1, p. 1087.
94 Ibidem, p. 1086: “I offered what I thought to be the obvious answer at the
conference this issue reports, but since Waldron repeats his claim in his written
article, he must have found my reply dishonorable. I am shameless enough to re-
peat it.”
My hunch, since I was present at the conference, is that at this point Dworkin
and Waldron seem to be talking past each other.
95 Vid. supra note 59 (and accompanying text).
sically fair or valuable —at least not always or in all cir-
cumstances. In sum, he doesn’t believe that “when people
in a society disagree about some decision (among two or
more options) the fairest way to proceed is for them all to
vote, for the votes to be counted, and for the option to be
chosen which attracts the greatest number of support-
ers.”96 However, Waldron is wrong in stating that Dworkin
does not confer “any legitimacy upon the option that the
majority supports”,97 as we have seen in his response to
him, it is not the case that majority decision is never fair or
legitimate, but at least not always or in all circumstances.
Curiously, Waldron’s “conclusion” that best characterizes
Dworkin’s claim is “(3) Majority-decision is not intrinsically
fair or intrinsically valuable in all circumstances.” And from
there he establishes a foundation for a broader claim,
which constitutes his main argument: “(5) A definition that
ties the term [i.e. democracy] firmly to majority-decision is
an unhelpful misconception of democracy.” Although (1)
and (2) might lay a foundation for (5), those conclusions,
besides being too strong, rule out any legitimate use for a
majority decision, because it is either silly to think it is in-
trinsically fair or valuable or that it is never intrinsically
fair or valuable, but as Waldron points out Dworkin cham-
pions the use of majority decision by courts exercising judi-
cial review. Certainly, (4) besides being too weak, it is too
marginal —by focusing in circumstances such as the life-
boat example— to lay a foundation for (5).98
If a “majority decision” is not intrinsically fair or intrinsi-
cally valuable in all circumstances (3), the concept of “de-
mocracy” cannot be tied to it (5), unless willing to admit
that “democracy” is not intrinsically fair or valuable. To the
contrary, Dworkin believes that “democracy” is intrinsically
fair or valuable; and, hence, has to untie “democracy” from
“majority decision”, which is not intrinsically fair or valu-
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96 Waldron, “A Majority in the Lifeboat”, supra note 60, p. 1043.
97 Idem.
98 Ibidem, pp. 1048-1049.
able —at least not always or in all circumstances— leading
to the distinction between the “majoritarian or statistical
conception”, which ties democracy to majority decision, and
the “partnership conception”, which unties democracy from
majority decision.99
Whereas the “majoritarian or statistical conception” consid-
ers that the majority decision is a necessary —and even suffi-
cient— condition of a democracy, the “partnership concep-
tion” considers that the majority decision is a mere contin-
gency neither necessary nor sufficient. Therefore, it is pos-
sible both to reject in a democracy the use of a majority
decision per default and to accept its use in some cases,
but neither in all circumstances nor always, including the
use of majority decision by courts exercising judicial review,
which is consistent with conclusions (3) and (5).
Assuming that majority decisions are appropriate in cir-
cumstances when they are fair; that they can only be fair
when certain conditions are met; and that such conditions
integrate certain choices that must be exempt from collec-
tive decision. The only question remaining to be answer is:
which are the choices that must be exempted from majority
decision? Actually, Waldron’s distinction between “choices
about particulars and choices about general issues of policy
and principle”100 is helpful to distinguish between general
choices or decisions proper to a legislative body, which are
more political than technical, and particular choices or de-
cisions proper to a judiciary —or even to a regulatory
agency, which are more technical than political, but un-
helpful to determine which are the choices that must be
exempted from majority decision because their illegitimacy.
My hunch is that we need to introduce a further distinc-
tion between impartial and partial choices or decisions;101
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99 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, p. 5.
100 Waldron, “A Majority in the Lifeboat”, supra note 60, pp. 1050-1052.
101 I am assuming that the distinction between objective and subjective criteria
is already settled in favor of objective choices or decisions only. Vid. Flores, Imer
B., “Legisprudence: The Role and Rationality of Legislators — vis-à-vis Judges— to-
that is, between choices or decisions, on the one hand,
made by someone who is not a party (impartial) and can be
more or less objective; and, on the other hand, taken by
someone who is a party (partial) and can be more or less
subjective and even biased. In a democracy, the former
—impartial choices or decisions— can be made by a major-
ity decision and the latter —partial choices or decisions—
cannot be taken by a majority decision. In that sense, it
seems clear to me that the justices of a Supreme Court can
decide about the life or death of a criminal by a majority
vote because they are making an impartial decision (they
are not a party), but those same justices of the Supreme
Court cannot decide about the life or death of one of the
justices by a majority vote (having to sacrifice one life to
save the rest) because they will be taking a partial decision
(they are a party). Suppose, following Fuller’s speluncean
explorers case, that they are trapped in a cave after a field
trip or in the main chamber of the Court after an earth-
quake, or, alternately, following Dworkin’s example, that
they are found in a lifeboat example situation after a cruise.
In both cases, a lottery or drawing lots will be a much fairer
or legitimate —and impartial— way of deciding which life
will be sacrificed for the sake of saving the rest.
Consider Dworkin’s (democratic) lifeboat example
again,102 he rejects a majority decision as democratic since
everyone is a party or a partner in the lifeboat and sacrific-
ing one will amount for a partial choice or decision being
impose over the life of one party or partner, which will not
be treated with equal concern and respect. On the contrary,
he accepts a decision by lottery, i.e. a non-majority deci-
sion, which grants to the life of each party or partner an
equal concern and respect. In short, Dworkin is going to re-
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wards the Realization of Justice”, Mexican Law Review, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 2,
2009, pp. 91-110; and , especially, pp. 94-100.
102 Let me suggest that Dworkin’s lifeboat is a democracy, whereas in the
Holmes case, quoted by Waldron the lifeboat is not a democracy, i.e. an autocracy,
where the captain makes or takes a decision regardless of the interest of the pas-
sengers. Vid. supra note 30.
ject any majoritarian decision which does not show equal
concern or respect not only for the life but also for the
rights of the parties or partners in a democracy, including
minorities, by failing to be impartial, and is willing to ac-
cept those that are impartial and do treat everyone with
equal concern and respect.
Finally, regarding Waldron’s unmet “challenge to defend-
ers of judicial review to explain the use of the majority prin-
ciple by courts exercising «counter-majoritarian» judicial re-
view”, I expect to have provided —or at least suggested— by
introducing the distinction between partial and impartial
choices or decisions an honorable answer. I guess the appar-
ent paradox is that the courts use the majority-decision as a
counter-majoritarian device, but I do not think it is really
counter-majoritarian and much less counter-democratic and
not even counter-representative, but merely counter-legisla-
tive or counter-executive, in the sense of contrary to a legis-
lative or executive decision which is overruled, for failing to
be impartial, objective and/or according to law.
Additionally, I will like briefly to point out a further justi-
fication for allowing a court to make or take their decisions
with a majority vote. Clause 40 of the Magna Carta
Libertatus reads as follow: “Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus,
aut differemus rectum aut justiciam”, i.e. “To no one will we
sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.”
Since the reason one goes to court is to get justice, refusing
or delaying to make a decision will amount to an injustice
and as such to something illegitimate. In short, “justice de-
layed is justice denied”. And so, if a court in order not to
delay or deny justice has to take a decision by a majority
vote it will, on the contrary, be legitimate.
V. CONCLUSION: TAKING RONALD DWORKIN SERIOUSLY
To conclude I will like to insist on the importance of tak-
ing Ronald Dworkin seriously. His overall thesis, as he rec-
ognizes, is unpopular now: “[the foxes have] ruled the roost
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in academic and literary philosophy for many decades” and
“[the h]edgehogs seem naïve or charlatans, perhaps even
dangerous.”103 Moreover, as he clarified in a Lecture —titled
“From Justice in Robes to Justice for Hedgehogs”— delivered
after being awarded the Héctor Fix-Zamudio International
Award at the Legal Research Institute of UNAM in Mexico
City back in November 23, 2006:104
[T]he titles [of Justice in Robes, i.e. a book already written
and published earlier that year, and Justice for Hedgehogs,
i.e. a book in which he was working at that time] are
meant to convey this, that we understand law, that we un-
derstand the role that justice plays in law, only when we
understand law not in isolation from the rest of human
value, but as part of a largest scheme of justice, using Isa-
iah Berlin’s idea: justice for hedgehogs, not for foxes. And
it’s part of my argument that interpretation is, as it domi-
nates in my view legal reasoning, a distinct kind of intel-
lectual activity but also has its presence across the whole
domain of interpretation. So then if we want to understand
interpretation as a legal activity, we have to think about
artistic interpretation, historical interpretation, biblical
hermeneutics, [and] literary study. And my argument in
Justice for Hedgehogs… is that we understand interpreta-
tion as a distinct intellectual activity by accepting that in
interpretation, across all these domains, the purpose of
the activity is part of the test of truth.
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103 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, supra note 1, p. 2. For the depiction of a
hedgehog applied to Madame Michel, one of Barbery’s characters, but equally ap-
plicable mutatis mutando to Dworkin, vid. Barbery, The Elegance of the Hedgehog,
supra note 42, p. 143: “Madame Michel has the elegance of the hedgehog: on the
outside, she’s covered in quills, a real fortress, but my gut feeling is that on the in-
side, she has the same simple refinement as the hedgehog: a deceptively indolent
little creature, fiercely solitary —and terribly elegant.”
104 Dworkin, Ronald, “From Justice in Robes to Justice for Hedgehogs” (manu-
script on file with Problema).
